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WHOSE LAND IS IT ANYWAY? THE TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME 





In the past few years, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Brunei have been attempting to untie the Gordian knot that has arisen over 
the Spratly Islands.  The Spratly Islands archipelago is a cluster of 
approximately 100 islands, islets, cays, reefs, atolls, rocks, shoals, and 
banks in the South China Sea.1  They are located between 4º and 11º3’ 
North Latitude and 109º30’ and 117º50’ East Latitude.2  Including 
territorial waters, the Spratly Islands cover approximately 69,500 square 
miles.3  The majority of the islands are too small and arid to support 
permanent settlements, and none of the islands have any indigenous 
inhabitants.4  The islands also have limited fresh water sources and few 
significant mainland resources.5  Notwithstanding, the Spratly Islands do 
have strategic, political, and economic value.6  The Spratly Islands’ worth 
lies in the sea-lanes that run through the islands, which are needed for trade 
into East Asia; their extensive fishing waters, which the controlling state 
could restrict a state’s access to; and the hydrocarbon,7 oil, and gas deposits, 
which are presumed to be under the sea-beds.8 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Florida International University College of Law.  I would like to thank 
Professor Manuel Gomez for his guidance; Riya Resheidat for her edits and comments; and Louis 
Holzberg for his advice and feedback. 
1  See Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute in the South China Sea: Problems, 
Policies, and Prospects for Diplomatic Accommodation, in INVESTIGATING BUILDING MEASURES IN THE 
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 53, 55 (Rajeet K. Singh ed., 1999). 
2  Id. at 56. 
3  Id. 
4  See generally DAVID HANCOX & VICTOR PRESCOTT, MARITIME BRIEFING: A GEOGRAPHICAL 
DESCRIPTION OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS AND AN ACCOUNT OF HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEYS AMONGST 
THOSE ISLANDS (Clive Schofield ed., vol. 1 no. 6 1995). 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
7  Hydrocarbons are organic compounds “found in coal, crude oil, and natural gas.”Hydrocarbon, 
BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/hydrocarbon.html (last visited Jan. 6, 
2017).  They “are used as fuels, solvents, and raw materials” for products including “dyes, pesticides, 
and plastics.”  Id.  They are predominantly used as a combustible fuel source.  See Richard M.J. 
Renneboog, Uses of Hydrocarbons, SCIENCEIQ.COM, http://www.scienceiq.com/Facts/UsesOfHydr 
ocarbons.cfm (last visited Jan. 6, 2017). 
8  See Jill Goldenziel, International Law is the Real Threat to China’s South China Sea Claims, 
DIPLOMAT (Nov. 3, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/international-law-is-the-real-threat-to-
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The end of the Cold War brought about the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and its subsequent departure from Cam Ranh Bay; the United 
States’ closure of naval bases in the Philippines; and Vietnam’s withdrawal 
from Cambodia.9  This created a strategic vacuum in the South China Sea.10  
These events also spurred several East Asian countries to evaluate the 
strategic and national security implications of sovereignty claims to the 
islands in the South China Sea.11  Currently, five states, China, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei, claim to be the sovereign 
owners of the islands, but this is still an unsettled international dispute.12  
Although there are five claimants, China and Vietnam are the only states to 
claim title to the entire island group while the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Brunei only claim title to a portion.13  Brunei does not lay claim to any of 
the islands, but does claim the area that falls within its exclusive economic 
zone (“EEZ”).14  The majority of these claims are overlapping.15 
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNLCLOS”), which China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, 
and other states have all ratified, a state is allowed to establish a twelve-
mile territorial sea and a 200-mile EEZ from its border with the ocean.16  If 
one of these states were to establish legal sovereignty over the Spratly 
Islands, it would be entitled to exclusive rights to explore and exploit the 
islands, and the surrounding sea-bed and ocean.17  Furthermore, it would 
have the right to control the sea-lanes that run in-between the Spratly 
Islands.18  These sea-lanes are used by foreign commercial fishing boats and 
are the only way to reach the South Asian ports.19  The state would also 
 
chinas-south-china-sea-claims; Joyner, supra note 1, at 55. 
9  See Joyner, supra note 1, at 53. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  See Ice Cases: Spratly Islands Dispute, INVENTORY OF CONFLICT & ENVIRONMENT (May 
1997), http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/Spratly.htm. 
13  Id. 
14  See Karen Friar, China’s Artificial Islands in Before-and-After Photos, MARKET WATCH (Jan. 
4, 2016, 9:32 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinas-artificial-islands-in-before-and-after-
photos-2015-10-27. 
15  See Derek Watkins, What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-
china-sea.html?_r=1 (last updated Oct. 27, 2015). 
16  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea]. 
17  Id. 
18  Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Position Paper 
of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China 
Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Dec. 7, 2014), http://fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ 
zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml. 
19  See Joyner, supra note 1, at 57. 
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have control of the extensive fishing waters around the island group and 
could control which states and private entities have access to these waters.  
Moreover, it could extract and utilize the extensive amounts of 
hydrocarbons presumed to be under the ocean bed.20 
When a state ratifies UNCLOS, it agrees to settle any disputes arising 
from the interpretation or application of UNCLOS through international 
arbitration.  Depending on the type of dispute and other factors, UCNLOS 
gives jurisdiction to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(“ITLS”), the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), or an international 
tribunal constituted according to Annex VII or Annex VIII of UNCLOS.21  
Pursuant to Article 287(3) of UNCLOS, if a state has not expressed a 
preference of dispute resolution available under 287(1), then arbitration 
under Annex VII is the default means of settlement.22  Also, pursuant to 
Article 287(5), if the states involved in the dispute have not agreed to the 
same method of dispute settlement, Annex VII will be the default means of 
settlement.23  This is provided that the states have not stated any 
reservations or optional exceptions per Article 298.24  The Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (“PCA”) is an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with 
Annex VIII of UNCLOS.25  Both the ICJ and the PCA have recently 
decided cases that involved interpreting UNCLOS.26  But, one of the 
problems that arises with decisions by the ICJ is that they are not 
enforceable; compliance is often urged by conscience or morality.27  
Although China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei are all 
signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards of 1958,28 China is not likely to honor any 
 
20  Id. 
21  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, 
https://pca-cpa.org/en/services/arbitration-services/unclos/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2017). 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26 See generally Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 625 (Dec. 17); Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), Special Agreement, 2 R. 
Int’l. Arb. Awards 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
27  See W. M. Reisman, The Enforceability of International Judgments and Awards, 63 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 2 (1969). 
28  The Convention’s principal aim is that foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards will not be 
discriminated against, and it obliges parties to ensure such awards are recognized and generally capable 
of enforcement in its jurisdiction in the same way as domestic awards.  An ancillary aim of the 
Convention is to require courts of parties to give full effect to arbitration agreements by requiring courts 
to deny the parties access to court in contravention of their agreement to refer the matter to an arbitral 
tribunal. See UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (“UNCITRAL”), 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL (1958), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-Convention-E.pdf. 
07-NINAFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/17  7:23 PM 
394 FIU Law Review [Vol. 12:391 
decision made by the PCA or the ICJ since it has already challenged and 
rejected the jurisdiction of the PCA in the Spratly Islands dispute, and 
would likely challenge and reject the jurisdiction of the ICJ if it were to 
arise.29 
Also, China has previously refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction 
and authority of international courts.30  This is evident because it is one of 
the few states that have refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ as 
compulsory, and it recently denied the jurisdiction of the PCA to adjudicate 
the maritime jurisdiction of the Philippines in the South China Sea.  
Although China has historically declined to work through international 
courts, it has promoted peaceful negotiations and cooperation to resolve the 
dispute between the states involved with the Spratly Islands.  China is a 
signatory to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea, a declaration of conduct signed in 2002 explicitly undertaking “to 
resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes [in the South China Sea] by 
peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through 
friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly 
concerned.”31  Because of China’s historic refusal to work through 
international courts, its recent rejection of the PCA’s jurisdiction, and its 
previous willingness to participate in bilateral treaties with the competing 
states, the ideal solution for all parties involved in the dispute over the 
Spratly Islands would be to negotiate a treaty where they would set aside 
the territorial claims and establish a Joint Development Zone Agreement 
similar to the Joint Development Zone Agreement established by Nigeria 
and Sao Tome and Principe. 
This comment will begin by discussing the historic and modern 
assertions that each state has made in support of its claims to the islands.  It 
will also examine the very recent actions of each of the states in the South 
China Sea, which are leading to escalated tensions in the area.  It will then 
examine each state’s claims to the Spratly Islands and analyze the strengths 
and weaknesses of each claim in light of previous ICJ and PCA decisions 
and provisions of UNCLOS.  It will then discuss the structure and content 
of the Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development Zone 
Agreement, and suggest the states disputing control over the Spratly Islands 
create a similar agreement. 
 
 
29  Id.; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 18. 
30  China is not the only state to do this.  The United States often also refuses to work through 
foreign courts because it believes that its court system is better able to resolve disputes. 
31  Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”), Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea, section 4 (Nov. 4, 2002), http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-
parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. CHINA’S CLAIMS 
 
China’s claims to the Spratly Islands are based on discovery and 
occupation, but, unfortunately for China, the names for the islands in the 
South China Sea change frequently in Chinese literature, making it difficult 
for researchers to track which islands China previously occupied.32  This is 
unfortunate for China because it makes it difficult for any court to 
substantiate its claims to the Spratly Islands.  China affirms that the Spratly 
Islands were terra nullius33 prior to their discovery and that they have been 
explored, used, and occupied by Chinese fishermen since ancient times.34  
In Chinese mythology, the islands in the South China Sea are collectively 
described as the “Tongue of the Dragon” and are portrayed as an 
inseparable part of China.35  According to China, starting in 111 B.C.E., 
under Emperor Wu Di of the Han Dynasty, it began exploiting the islands 
in the South China Sea.36  China claims that during this time the Spratly 
Islands were first discovered.37  Furthermore, starting in 1405, Emperor 
Cheng Zu of the Ming Dynasty sent an explorer, Cheng Ho, to utilize and 
settle the islands in the South China Sea and include them on maps as 
Chinese territory.38  This is the first time that the Spratly Islands were 
roughly charted.39  However, “ancient records are sparse, incomplete, and 
do not provide compelling evidence of routine occupation, effective 
administration, or assertion of sovereign control.”40 
China also claims to have maps from 1775, 1810, and 1817 
demonstrating that it had discovered and occupied the islands in the South 
China Sea.41  Ch’en Lun Chiung, a Chinese scholar, also published a book 
 
32  See Lee G. Cordner, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea, 25 OCEAN DEV. & 
INT’L L. 61, 62 (1994). 
33  Terra nullius “is a Latin term that means land belonging to no one or no man’s land. In 
international law, a territory which has never been subject to the sovereignty of any state, or over which 
any prior sovereign has expressly or implicitly relinquished sovereignty is terra nullius. Sovereignty 
over territory which is terra nullius can be acquired through occupation. International sea, and celestial 
bodies would come under the term terra nullius.” Terra Nullius, USLEGAL, https://defintions.uslegal 
.com/t/terra-nullius/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2017). 
34  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 62. 
35  Id. 
36  See S. Yeh, Nansha Situation and International Law, 19 ECON. & L. 27, 29 (1988). 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 62. 
40  Id. at 63. 
41  See Teh-Kuang Chang, China’s Claim of Sovereignty Over Spratly and Parcel Islands: A 
Historical and Legal Perspective, 23 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 399, 405 (1991). 
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in 1730, which geographically described the Spratly Islands.42  Moreover, 
British books from 1923 and French books from 1927 also have recorded 
that the Chinese were living on some of the islands in the South China 
Sea.43  However, a 1928 Chinese Government Report portrays the 
southernmost delimitation of Chinese territory as the Xisha Islands, also 
known as the Parcels, and makes no mention of the Spratly Islands.44 
In the Sino-French Treaty of 1887, Vietnam was named as a French 
protectorate and France laid claims to the territory west of 105°43’ East of 
Paris, in effect ceding the territory east of this line to China.45  Because the 
Spratly Islands lie east of this line, China cites to this treaty to affirm that 
the Spratly Islands were under Chinese ownership.46  However, although 
the Spratly Islands do lie east of this line, the Spratly Islands were neither 
mentioned nor named in the treaty; the treaty does not include a northern, 
southern, or eastern line of demarcation; and respective interpretations of 
the treaty in Chinese and French are controversial.47 
Since 1914, China has employed and developed what is known today 
as the “nine-dash line” in its maps.48  This line is used to delineate its claims 
to the South China Sea.49 Although China does claim that it was the first to 
discover and occupy the islands, it concedes that in 1930 and 1932 France 
began occupying a variety of the islands that China claimed belonged to 
China.50  China strongly protested the French government for taking the 
islands.51  In 1939, France relinquished their claims to the islands to Japan, 
and Japan took over the entire chain of islands in the South China Sea.52  
Through this invasion, Japan established the first recorded permanent 
garrison and was the first to demonstrate effective sovereign control over 
the Spratly Islands.53  By 1945, Japan had surrendered and returned the 
islands to China; and, by 1946, China had regained physical possession of 
the islands.54 
 
42  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 62. 
43  See Chang, supra note 41, at 406. 
44  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 62. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. at 63. 
47  Id. at 65. 
48  See generally Jane Perlez, Vietnam’s Law on Contested Islands Draws China’s Ire, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/22/world/asia/china-criticizes-vietnam-in-
dispute-over-islands.html. 
49  Id.; see also Friar, supra note 14. 
50  See Chang, supra note 41, at 406. 
51  See Jianming Shen, Chinese Sovereignty Over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical 
Perspective, 1 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 94, 98 (2002). 
52  See Chang, supra note 41, at 406; Shen, supra note 51, at 98. 
53  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 64. 
54  See Chang, supra note 41, at 406; see also Shen, supra note 51, at 98–99. 
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China maintains that its claims to the Spratly Islands were further 
solidified by the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the Sino-Japanese 
Treaty of 1952 because Japan formally renounced its claims to the Spratly 
Islands in both.55  Although Vietnam made claims to the islands at the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, China asserts that these claims are null 
because China was not invited to participate in that treaty and because 
“Premier Zhou Enlai issued a statement reiterating China’s unquestionable 
sovereignty over these islands and warning against any arrangement at the 
Conference that might be aimed at challenging or affecting China’s 
sovereignty.”56  Also, although Japan did formally renounce its claims to 
the Spratly Islands at the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, it did not 
name a sovereign successor.57 
In the 1950s and 1960s China’s claims to the Spratly Islands were 
further challenged.  Vietnam began to occupy some of the islands in the 
South China Sea and the Philippines declared sovereignty over various 
islands, claiming it discovered some of the Spratly Islands.58  Beginning in 
the 1960s, Malaysia and Brunei had also begun laying claims to some of the 
Spratly Islands by occupying certain islands.59  Tensions in the South China 
Sea escalated in 1974 when Vietnam and China had a battle over some of 
the islands that Vietnam had claimed.60  This resulted in China reclaiming 
some of the islands Vietnam previously occupied.61  Relations were further 
strained in 1987 and 1988 when two military encounters occurred between 
the Chinese and Vietnamese navies, which caused casualties on both 
sides.62  In 1995, China had another military confrontation on the South 
China Sea, but this time with the Philippines’ naval forces.63  Since then, 
the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia have increased their military and 
non-military presence in the South China Sea to protect their respective 
claims.64 
In 2002, China signed an agreement with the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) agreeing not to make any provocative moves in 
disputed territory.65  This included the agreement that none of the disputing 
 
55  See Chang, supra note 41, at 401. 
56  Shen, supra note 51, at 99. 
57  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 64. 
58  See Shen, supra note 51, at 100. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  See Trefor Moss, China Begins Construction in Spratly Islands, WALL STREET J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304908304579561123291666730 (updated May 14, 
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countries would begin construction on disputed features.66  China violated 
this agreement in 2014 when it began construction on Johnson South Reef, 
a reef which the Philippines claimed possession of.67  That same year, 
China deployed a rig in the South China Sea.68  These actions were seen as 
assertive behavior, and therefore provocative moves prohibited by the 
agreement with ASEAN, by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Brunei, all of which have their own claims in the South China Sea.69 
Recently, China has been building islands in the South China Sea, 
further straining the already tense relations with its Asian neighbors.70  It 
does this by breaking up sediment from the sea-bed and transporting and 
depositing it on top of reefs.71  This has caused the destruction of several 
reefs and extensive damage to the surrounding marine life.72  Although 
other states have expanded the islands that they claim, the speed and scale 
of China’s construction has distressed competing nations.73  As of 2016, 
China has constructed “port facilities, military buildings, and an airstrip on 
the islands, with recent imagery showing evidence of two more airstrips 
under construction.”74  Although the Chinese were not the first to begin 
island construction in the Spratly Islands, its island building has been much 
quicker than similar efforts in the South China Sea.75 
These island installations are intended to bolster China’s claims in the 
Spratly Islands.76  The new islands allow China to control and exploit 
portions of the sea, exercise more control over fishing in the region, extract 
natural resources from the sea-bed, and fortify the Chinese’s territorial 
claims. The Spratly Islands also enable continued Chinese air and sea 
patrols.77  One of the new islands is strategically significant because it has 
an airstrip long enough for planes, fighter jets, and large transport aircrafts 
to land.78  These are not the first airstrips in the region; every other country 
that occupies islands in the South China Sea operates their own airstrips, 
 
2014, 7:58 AM). 
66  Id. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  See Watkins, supra note 15. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
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but China would be the first to have three airstrips in the area.79  By 
preserving the original buildings on the islands, China can assert that it is 
only expanding its former facilities, which is what the competing states 
have done on the islands that they occupy. 
 
B. VIETNAM’S CLAIMS 
 
Vietnam’s claims to the Spratly Islands are based on discovery and 
occupation.80  Official Vietnamese documents assert that its ownership can 
be traced to 1650, but these claims are largely unsupported.81  However, in 
1816, Emperor Gia-long did claim governance over the islands, and an 
inaccurate 1838 Vietnamese map does present the Spratly Islands, named 
Van Ly Truong Sa, as Vietnamese territory.82 
In the Sino-French Treaty of 1887, the French protectorate declared 
Vietnam to be French territory, but the treaty avoids any mention of islands 
in the South China Sea.83  When France claimed the Spratly Islands in 
1933, Vietnam did not protest the taking.84  And, at the 1951 San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, France signed the treaty relinquishing its claims over the 
islands with no attempt to reassert its sovereignty over them and with no 
reservations to the treaty.85  At this treaty’s conference, Vietnam affirmed 
its sovereign control over the Spratly Islands, but this claim was 
immediately and strongly challenged by the statement of Premier Zhou 
Enlai, despite the fact that China was not represented at the conference 
because they were not invited.86  Vietnam argued that since its claim passed 
uncontested by conference members, there was universal recognition of its 
claim.87 
In 1956, when the Philippines first laid claims to the Spratly Islands, 
the Republic of South Vietnam protested, which modern-day Vietnam 
believes reaffirmed their ownership of the Spratly Islands.88  But, the 
government of North Vietnam supported Chinese ownership of the Spratly 
Islands.89  By 1973, the Republic of South Vietnam had incorporated eleven 
 
79  Id. 
80  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 65. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. at 66. 
86  Id. at 65. 
87  Id. at 66. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
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of the islands and occupied five of the islands.90  And, by 1975, upon 
Vietnamese reunification, the government reasserted its claims over the 
entire island group despite North Vietnam’s previous support of China’s 
claims.91  Since then, the “Vietnamese have continued to maintain 
precarious garrisons on up to twenty-two features of the Spratlys, 
supporting a claim to effective occupation of part of the Spratly archipelago 
since 1973.”92 
In January 2016, Vietnam formally accused China of violating its 
sovereignty because China landed a plane on an airstrip on one of its new 
islands.93  This new island lies in an area that both China and Vietnam 
claim sovereignty over.94  According to newspaper sources, “Vietnam 
reportedly logged 46 such incidents—which the country says endangers air 
safety and violates its sovereignty—in just one week.”95  The Foreign 
Minister of Vietnam asserted that the airfield was built illegally in 
Vietnam’s territory.96  China’s Foreign Minister answered these assertions, 
claiming that the flight to the new airfield was completely within China’s 
sovereignty.97  In response to this, Vietnam has sent letters of protest to 
China and the International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”).98  The 
Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam also sent letters to the ICAO, several 
other aviation bodies, and more than one hundred international carriers, 
asking them to implement measures to prevent China from continuing these 
actions and urging them to protest China’s actions.99  Vietnam expects the 
ICAO to issue warnings to China because it is responsible for international 
civil aviation activities.100 
 
C. THE PHILIPPINES’ CLAIMS 
 
The Philippines’ claim to the majority of the islands in the Spratly 
 
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 65. 
92  Id. at 66. 
93  See Reuters, Vietnam Protests After China Lands Plane on Disputed Spratly Islands, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2016, 12:37 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/03/vietnam-
protests-after-china-lands-plane-on-disputed-spratly-islands. 
94  Id. 
95  Sneha Shankar, Vietnam Asks International Aviation Community to Condemn China Over 
Spratly Island Flights, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016, 8:09 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/vietnam-
asks-international-aviation-community-condemn-china-over-spratly-islands-2258169. 
96  See Reuters, supra note 93. 
97  Id. 
98  See Shankar, supra note 95. 
99  Id. 
100  Id. 
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Island group stems from the discovery of terra nullius by Tomas Cloma, a 
Filipino businessman and lawyer.  Cloma claims to have discovered the 
islands in 1947.101  And, in 1956, he proclaimed the islands as a new state 
named Kalayaan and established himself as the chairman of the Supreme 
Council of the new state.102  He established small settlements on these 
islands, but remained physically present on them for only a few months.103  
Although the Filipino government remained ambiguous about Cloma’s 
claims, it did assert that the Kalayaan state was terra nullius and separate 
from the Spratly Islands.104 
In 1974, the Philippines received ownership of the Kalayaan state from 
Cloma.105  In 1978, the Philippines’ President declared that the Kalayaan 
state was part of Filipino sovereign territory.106  He also declared a 200-
nautical mile EEZ extending from the territorial sea baseline.107  Currently, 
the Philippines occupies eight islands in the Spratly Islands.108 
In 2013, the Philippines took legal action against China and filed a 
complaint with the PCA in order to initiate arbitral proceedings against 
China for breaching its sovereignty in the South China Sea.109  While China 
immediately rejected the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the PCA originally 
found that it had jurisdiction over the majority of the claims that the 
Philippines brought against China, but did not make a decision about the 
rest of the claims the Philippines made until its final Award was issued.110 
Most recently, China has demanded all Filipino military forces 
withdraw from one of the disputed islands in the Spratly Island group.111  
The Foreign Minister of China stated, “We again call on the Philippines to 
withdraw their personnel and construction from the islands which the 
Filipino side illegally occupied, refrain from actions that harm regional 
peace and stability, and do not facilitate Chinese-Filipino relations.”112  This 
was in response to peaceful, Filipino student protesters, who were present 
 
101  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 66. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. at 67. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. 
109  See Case No. 2013-19 (Phil. v. China), Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility at ¶ 136 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) [hereinafter Case No. 2013-19], https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506. 
110  Id. at ¶ 137. 
111  See Jess McHugh, South China Sea Dispute 2015: Philippines Should Withdraw Military 
From Spratly Islands, Beijing Demands, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015, 7:55 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-2015-philippines-should-withdraw-military-spratly-
islands-2240811. 
112  Id. 
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on one of the largest islands in the Spratly Island group for three days, 
demonstrating to condemn China’s continuing construction of new islands 
and to assert the Philippine’s absolute right to the islands.113 
On June 30, 2016, the newly elected Rodrigo Duterte assumed the 
presidency of the Philippines.114  President Duterte, described as a 
“maverick,” “controversial,” and “an executioner who would bring terror to 
the Philippines,” campaigned on very forthright statements about the South 
China Sea, including that “he would sail to the disputed islands and plant 
the Philippine flag there.”115  As a political outsider and skeptic of the 
United States’ involvement, President Duterte has expressed a willingness 
to negotiate with China over the disputed islands, which is a very different 
approach from the previous administration, which filed for arbitration over 
the matter.116  The Philippines will soon be faced with the choice of either 
maintaining its alliance with the United States or making deals with China; 
a decision which will significantly impact all states currently disputing the 
Spratly Islands. 
 
D. MALAYSIA AND BRUNEI’S CLAIMS 
 
Both Malaysia and Brunei’s claims to the southern portion of the 
Spratly Islands are based on their geographic proximity to the islands.  
Under UNCLOS Article 76, the legal continental shelf is the “submerged 
prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, [which] consists of the 
sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope, and the rise.”117  UNCLOS does 
not reference or have any provision for land that rises above sea level.118  
So, under UNCLOS, none of the states contesting ownership of the islands 
or the surrounding waters, can claim the continental shelf of cays, islets, 
atolls, or other similar above sea level features.  Furthermore, under 
UNCLOS, the claiming state does not need to demonstrate any form of 
control over the continental shelf to prove its ownership.119 
Malaysia, in its claims, has invoked UNCLOS; specifically, the 
 
113  Id. 
114  Shirley Escalante, Rodrigo Duterte Officially Declared Philippines Election Winner; Leni 
Robredo Wins VP Race, ABC NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-28/rodrigo-duterte-officially-
declared-philippines-election-winner/7455682 (updated May 27, 2016, 8:58 PM). 
115  Philippines Election: Maverick Rodrigo Duterte Wins Presidency, BBC NEWS (May 10, 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36253612. 
116  Wyatt Olson, South China Sea Has Become Flashpoint Between American Status Quo and 
Chinese Naval Ambitions, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.stripes.com/news/south-china-
sea-has-become-flashpoint-between-american-status-quo-and-chinese-naval-ambitions-1.432079. 
117  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 16, at art. 76. 
118  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 67. 
119  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 16, at art. 77. 
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provisions that address the continental shelf and its promulgated 
Continental Shelf Act of 1966, which is modeled after the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf.120  Malaysia’s claims coincided with 
the publication of the Malaysian Map of 1979, which defined Malaysia’s 
continental shelf area.121  Malaysia also claimed an EEZ in 1984, but it has 
not yet published an official map outlining the coordinates of these 
delimitations or their baselines.122  Malaysia has also “declared sovereign 
jurisdiction over all islands and atolls on the prescribed continental shelf on 
the theory that the 1958 Geneva Conventions on territorial waters and 
continental shelf boundaries and LOSC [UNCLOS] support such an 
assertion.”123  But, Malaysia is also asserting a twelve-nautical-mile 
territorial sea from Swallow Reef and Amboyna Cay, which are above sea 
level at high tide.124  Since 1983, Malaysia has stationed troops on three of 
the islands that it claims, and it has reportedly built a holiday resort on one 
of the islands.125 
Brunei, the state with the smallest jurisdictional claim, bases its claims 
upon its continental shelf delimitation, which was first established by 
Britain in 1954.126  Brunei’s claim stems from UNCLOS’s continental shelf 
provisions and the Territorial Waters of Brunei Act from 1982.127  It claims 
a  “12-mile territorial sea; a 200-mile EEZ; and a continental shelf to the 
outer edge of the continental margin, or to 200 nautical miles where the 
outer edge does not extend up to that distance.”128  Brunei does not claim 
territorial sovereignty over any of the disputed islands; rather, its claims are 
for maritime jurisdiction throughout its EEZ.129  Essentially, Brunei is only 
asking for its complete jurisdiction throughout the EEZ that UNCLOS 
guarantees.  Because none of the islands lie within this zone, it is not 
asserting sovereignty over any of the islands. 
In 1980, Britain and Malaysia entered into discussions concerning the 
maritime delimitation of their adjacent maritime boundaries.130  This 
discussion was continued in 1984, after Brunei’s independence from 
 
120  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 66. 
121  Id. 
122  Id.; see also J. ASHLEY ROACH, MALAYSIA AND BRUNEI: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR CLAIMS IN 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 2 (2014), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2014-U-008434.pdf. 
123  Cordner, supra note 32, at 67. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 68; see also DANIEL J. DZUREK, Maritime Briefing: THE 
SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE: WHO’S ON FIRST 45 (Clive Schofield ed., vol. 2 no. 1, 1996). 
127  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 67. 
128  ROACH, supra note 122, at 35. 
129  See DZUREK, supra note 126, at 45. 
130  See Cordner, supra note 32, at 67. 
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Britain.131  By March of 2009, after many years of bilateral discussions 
between Brunei and Malaysia, the leaders of both states signed an Exchange 
of Letters.132  The Exchange of Letters included, among other decisions, the 
final delimitation of the maritime boundaries and the permanent right of 
Malaysians to cross through Brunei’s maritime zones.133  The agreement 
over the maritime boundaries also solidified the previously contested 
delimitation of the territorial sea, the continental shelf, and the EEZs of 
both states.134  But, neither state has publicly announced or published these 
maritime boundaries, and Articles 75(2) and 84(2) of UNCLOS require 
publication.135 
 Recently, Malaysia granted Chinese naval ships access to use one of its 
ports near the Philippines and the Spratly Islands as a stopover location.136  
Analysts claim this was done in an attempt to maintain peace in the South 
China Sea and avoid taking sides in the dispute.137  Scholars claim this act is 
a gesture of neutrality because that port was already open to the United 
States, France, and other states.138  Malaysia has been cautious to confront 
China, unlike the Philippines and Vietnam, even in the face of its 
disapproval of Chinese naval and coastguard ships entering contested 
waters and its fishermen’s resentment of Chinese competitors exploiting the 
area.139  A military analyst argues that this action demonstrates China’s 
willingness to cooperate with smaller nations in the disputed area, and is 
beneficial to Malaysia because stronger relations with China will give it 
more confidence when dealing with the Philippines and Vietnam in the 
contested region.140  Brunei has been silent with regard to states’ recent 






131  Id. 
132  See generally ROACH, supra note 122. 
133  See ROACH, supra note 122, at 46. 
134  Id. 
135  See ROACH, supra note 122, at 13; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, supra note 16, at art. 75(2), 84(2). 
136  See PLA Navy Gains Use of Port in Malaysia Close to Spratly Islands, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (Nov. 21, 2015, 12:23 AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/1881300/pla-navy-gains-use-port-malaysia. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  See DZUREK, supra note 126, at 45. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
 
Because all five competing states have ratified UNCLOS, they have 
implicitly agreed to settle the dispute arising from its interpretation through 
international arbitration.  UNCLOS gives jurisdiction to the ITLS, the ICJ, 
or the PCA, and the ICJ and the PCA have previously decided cases 
interpreting UNCLOS.142  Analyzing past cases from these two courts 
assists in determining how the courts evaluate and apply the laws and how 
they would likely weigh the strengths and weaknesses of each state’s claim 
to the Spratly Islands.  Per the existing state of the law, none of the states 
competing for sovereignty over the Spratly Islands have perfect claims.  
And, because of China’s constant refusal to work through international 
laws, any decision made by the ICJ or PCA would likely be rejected and 
ignored by it.  The best decision for all states involved would be to work 
through a Joint Development Zone Agreement, similar to the one 
established by Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe.  The best chance for 
this to work would be if China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Brunei worked together in developing this agreement without any 
intervention from third party states, like the United States or non-
governmental organizations. 
 
A. INDONESIA V. MALAYSIA 
 
In 2002, the ICJ held, in a sixteen to one decision, that sovereignty 
over the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands belonged to Malaysia and not to 
Indonesia.143  Although decisions by the ICJ are typically made by a panel 
of 15 judges, in this particular case, there were two supplemental ad hoc 
judges.144  Each party had the opportunity to choose an ad hoc judge to sit 
in the case because none of the elected judges were from either party’s 
nationality.145 
The first issue the court considered was whether there had been valid 
treaties that decided whether either state could claim sovereignty over the 
islands.146  Claims based on treaty law are normally very persuasive to the 
ICJ because treaties are binding on parties that have ratified them, and 
because Article 38 of the ICJ Statute requires the court to consider treaties 
 
142  See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 16. 
143  See Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), Judgment, 2002 
I.C.J. Rep. 625 (Dec. 17). 
144  Id. at ¶ 10. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. 
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when making decisions.147 
In Indonesia v. Malaysia, Indonesia’s claims to the islands stemmed 
from the 1891 Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands.  The 
ICJ examined the 1891 Convention, the record of negotiations, the 
subsequent conduct of the parties to the 1891 Convention, and the maps 
submitted by both states.148  It concluded that the object and purpose of the 
1891 Convention was not to determine sovereignty over the islands east of 
the line of possession, and therefore did not give Indonesia a title on which 
it could claim the Ligitan and Sipadan islands.149 
Along with treaty law, the court considered uti possidetis.150  The 
doctrine states that uti possidetis prevails over competing claims based on 
occupation.151  These types of claims can pose problems, as they did in this 
case, because administrative colonial borders are typically drawn 
vaguely.152  The ICJ considered whether Indonesia or Malaysia gained title 
to Ligitan and Sipadan by succession and rejected both states’ claims to uti 
possidetis.153  It rejected Indonesia’s claim that it retained title to the islands 
as successor to the Netherlands and also rejected Malaysia’s claim that it 
gained sovereignty over the islands from the Sultan of Sulu.154  These 
claims were rejected because the documents, which transferred ownership 
of the islands between the states, never mentioned the islands; the claiming 
states never acted as if the islands were part of their territory; and the maps 
and treaties were generally too vague to draw any solid conclusions.155  The 
ICJ decided that if there were no valid treaties and uti possidetis did not 
apply, the next question would be whether effectivités156 could be applied to 
determine which state had the stronger legal basis to its claims.157 
A claim based on effectivités, or effective control, is that a state or 
group has “uncontested administration of the land and its resident 
 
147  See generally id. 
148  Id. at ¶ 17. 
149  Id. at ¶ 50. 
150  Id. at ¶ 90.  “Uti Possidetis is a Latin term which means ‘as you possess.’”  Uti Possidetis, 
USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/uti-possidetis/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).  Uti Possidetis is a 
doctrine through which states that recently gained their independence can inherit the pre-independence 
administrative boundaries created by their former colonizers. 
151  See Bryan Taylor Sumner, Note, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 
DUKE L.J. 1779, 1790 (2004). 
152  Id. at 1791. 
153  See Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgement, 2002 
I.C.J. Rep. 625, ¶ 99 (Dec. 17). 
154  Id. at ¶ 119. 
155  Id. at ¶ 122. 
156  A principle of effective control. See id. at ¶ 128. 
157  Id. at ¶ 137. 
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population.”158  To establish effectivités, states need to prove two elements: 
1) the intention and will to act as a sovereign and 2) some actual exercise or 
display of such authority.159  The court further stated that “in many cases 
the tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual 
exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not make 
out a superior claim.”160  It also specifically noted that “in the case of very 
small islands which are uninhabited or not permanently inhabited, [like the 
Spratly islands] which have been of little economic importance, effectivités 
will indeed generally be scarce.”161  The court continued by establishing 
that “activities by private persons cannot be seen as effectivités if they do 
not take place on the basis of official regulations or under governmental 
authority.”162  It also observed that it could not take into consideration acts 
that took place after the date the dispute between the parties was solidified, 
unless those acts were a normal continuation of previous acts and were not 
done for the purpose of improving the legal position of the party taking the 
actions.163  Many scholars consider effectivités the most important factor in 
establishing a strong territorial claim.164 
The court in Indonesia v. Malaysia analyzed activities that evidenced 
an actual, continued exercise of authority over the islands.165  The ICJ 
concluded that Malaysia had title to Ligitan and Sipadan on the basis of 
effectivités because Malaysia had taken actions including the regulation and 
control of turtle eggs from the islands and the creation of a bird reserve on 
Sipadan.166  The court considered these actions as regulatory and 
administrative assertions of authority over the contested territory and, 
although few in number, they spanned a lengthy period of time and 
demonstrated an intention to exercise state functions on the two islands.167  
Indonesia’s claims failed mostly because it did not demonstrate state action 
over the islands, and its claims were severely weakened by an Indonesian 
waters act map, which defined its archipelagic baselines, that failed to 
include or even mention the Ligitan and Sipadan islands.168  The court did 
 
158  Sumner, supra note 151, at 1787. 
159  See Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgement, 2002 
I.C.J. Rep. 625, ¶ 129 (Dec. 17). 
160  Id. at ¶ 131. 
161  Id. at ¶ 135. 
162  Id. at ¶ 139. 
163  Id. at ¶ 140. 
164  See Sumner, supra note 151, at 1787. 
165  See Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgement, 2002 
I.C.J. Rep. 625, ¶ 127 (Dec. 17). 
166  Id. at ¶ 129. 
167  Id. at ¶ 137. 
168  Id. at ¶ 140. 
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not make a decision regarding the territorial waters or the maritime 
borders.169 
 
B. THE PALMAS CASE 
 
In 1928, the PCA arbitrated a territorial and maritime dispute over the 
Island of Palmas between the United States and the Netherlands.170  The 
United States and the Netherlands both claimed sovereignty over the 
Palmas islands, located between the Philippines and the Dutch East 
Islands.171  The United States claimed that Spain originally held sovereign 
title to the islands, and then ceded title to the United States through the 
Treaty of Paris.172  They also claimed title through contiguity, or 
geographical proximity, between the Philippines and the island.173  The 
Netherlands claimed sovereignty through their continuous display of 
authority over the island.174 
The PCA determined that discovery of a piece of land only resulted in 
inchoate title and was not sufficient to establish sovereignty.175  Sovereignty 
through inchoate title would only be sufficient if it was followed by 
effective occupation or a continuous display of authority.176  But, peaceful 
and continuous displays of sovereignty, like occupation and presence, could 
be as good as having title.177  Because the territorial sovereignty of the 
Netherlands on the Island of Palmas went uncontested from 1700 to 1906, 
and the Netherlands maintained effective control of the island throughout 
these years, its claim was stronger than the United States’ claim through 
inchoate title.178 
 
C. INDONESIA V. MALAYSIA STANDARD AND THE PALMAS CASE   
STANDARD 
 
Both China and Vietnam have attempted to use treaty law to justify 
their claims to the Spratly Islands, but neither of their claims would likely 
 
169  Id. at ¶ 139. 
170  See generally Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), Special Agreement, 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1928). 
171  Id. at 844. 
172  Id. 
173  Id. at 856. 
174  Id. at 857. 
175  Id. 
176  Id. at 860. 
177  Id. at 863. 
178  Id. at 864. 
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succeed at the ICJ.  The Sino-French Treaty of 1887, like the 1891 
Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands, was not written to 
determine sovereignty over the islands east of the line of demarcation, but 
rather to establish Vietnam as a French protectorate and solidify France’s 
claims in the west.  The ICJ would likely conclude that the treaty did not 
give China title of the Spratly Islands, like the 1891 Convention did not 
give Indonesia title of the Ligitian and Sipadan Islands, because the Spratly 
Islands are neither mentioned nor named; the north, south, and east lines of 
demarcation are not included; and the French and Chinese interpretations of 
the Treaty differ.  All of these factors indicate that the object and purpose of 
the Sino-French Treaty of 1887 was not to determine sovereignty over the 
disputed islands.  Furthermore, on December 25, 2000, China and Vietnam 
both agreed that the Sino-French Treaty of 1887 did not set the maritime 
boundaries between them.179  However, they did sign the Agreement on 
Fishery Cooperation in the Gulf of Tunkin and the Agreement on Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tunkin.180 
Both China and Vietnam also base part of their claims to the Spratly 
Islands on the San Francisco Peace Treaty.  In the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, Japan formally renounced all rights, titles, and claims to the Spratly 
Islands.  France also signed the treaty without reservation, and made no 
attempt to reassert its past claims over the islands.  The purpose of this 
treaty was not to grant title of the Spratly Islands to any state.  This is 
evidenced through the language of the treaty, which did not name a 
successor to the islands.  It is also evidenced in that, after Japan 
relinquished its claims, both China and Vietnam formally asserted that the 
Spratly Islands belonged to them.  Since neither of the treaties gave 
sovereign control over the islands to any state, the ICJ would not likely 
resolve this dispute using treaty law.  Furthermore, since the ICJ seems to 
be strict in honoring the object and purpose of the treaties it interprets, 
neither treaty would likely be found to have conveyed title to either China 
or Vietnam. 
Vietnam’s claims under uti possidetis would likely be unsuccessful.  
Vietnam claims title by French succession because France did occupy some 
of the islands in the South China Sea in the early 1930s.  However, the 
statements made by Gerard Chesnel, the French Consulate in Hong Kong, 
effectively nullified these claims.181  On March 22, 1977, he stated that the 
 
179  See Interview by Cheng Jieshe with Jianguo Xiao, Official, Legal Section of China’s Foreign 
Ministry (July 28, 2004). 
180  Id. 
181  See Junwu Pan, Regional Focus & Controversy: Maritime and Territorial Dispute in the 
South China Sea: Territorial Dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea: A Chinese 
Lawyer’s Perspective, JEAIL, Spring 2012, at 213. 
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agreement that officially recognized Vietnam’s independence did not 
mention the Spratly Islands as Vietnam’s territory.182  Because the ICJ is 
very strict in enforcing the object and purpose of the treaties it has to 
interpret, the agreement that officially recognized Vietnam’s independence 
would not be used to recognize Vietnam’s claims over the Spratly Islands. 
In Indonesia v. Malaysia and in the Palmas Case, the ICJ and the PCA 
used similar concepts to determine the strengths of a state’s claims.  In both 
cases, discovery was not sufficient to make a valid claim of sovereignty to a 
piece of land.  Rather, the ICJ looked to effectivités, and, the PCA looked to 
1) territorial sovereignty over the disputed land and 2) maintained effective 
control over the disputed land.  The state actions necessary to satisfy 
effective control under these two separate criteria are very similar. 
While China’s claims that the islands were terra nullis prior to its 
discovery is valid, the subsequent history of the islands makes China’s 
ancient claims to the entire island group unconvincing.  First, despite that 
China may have discovered the islands, a fact that has yet to be clearly 
established, throughout history it failed to maintain effective control of the 
islands it occupied.  This is evident from the fact that both Japan and France 
had control of the islands for a number of years.  China has also failed to 
show that any of the fishermen, explorers, or cartographers maintained a 
presence on the islands on the basis of official regulation or government 
authority, as is required by the ICJ.  Furthermore, while inchoate title could 
be received through discovery, per the PCA, it would only be sufficient if 
followed by effective occupation or a continuous display of authority, 
which, as mentioned above, China has failed to demonstrate. 
Second, China’s ancient claims are insufficient to evince effective 
control, under the Indonesia v. Malaysia standard or the Palmas Case 
standard, because the Chinese government did not exert uncontested 
administration of the Spratly Islands.  Rather, Chinese fishermen 
occasionally visited the islands and used the surrounding waters.  The acts 
of these fisherman cannot be used to establish effective control because 
they are not the acts of sovereigns and were not used to display authority or 
control.  Furthermore, the actions of the explorers and cartographers cannot 
be used to establish effective control either.  While the cartographers and 
explorers who briefly explored the region could be seen as acting under the 
direction of China, their actions do not evince effective control since their 
presence in the South China Sea was only temporary. 
Third, the 1928 Chinese Government Report portrays the southernmost 
delimitation of Chinese territory as the Parcel Islands,183 and makes no 
 
182  Id. 
183  The Parcel Islands lie north of the Spratly Islands. See Watkins, supra note 15. 
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mention of the Spratly Islands, which would severely weaken China’s 
claims of effective control like the Indonesian waters act map, which 
weakened Indonesia’s claim because it failed to include, or even mention, 
the Ligitan and Sipadan islands.  This would weaken the claim of effective 
control because it does not portray China as having the intention to act as 
sovereign over the islands since the islands are not even mentioned on its 
map.  Because effective control cannot be based on activities by private 
persons not acting on behalf of the government or official regulation, and 
effective control has to be maintained, China would not be able to establish 
effective control since ancient times. 
Vietnam’s historical claims of effective control are also weak.  
Throughout Vietnam’s history, there have been significant gaps in its 
control over the Spratly Islands.  This is exemplified during the time that 
Vietnam was occupied by France, which weakens its claims to the Spratly 
Islands since it could not maintain continuous control while it was being 
governed by another country.  First, France has explicitly denied ceding the 
Spratly Islands to Vietnam.  Second, although South Vietnam asserted its 
claims to the Spratly Islands in 1956 and 1958, North Vietnam expressed its 
support of China’s claims, not South Vietnam’s claims.  Third, modern day 
Vietnam is a successor to North Vietnam; so, North Vietnam’s statements 
in support of China’s claims to the Spratly Islands are more binding than 
South Vietnam’s 1950s claims, even though in 1975 modern day Vietnam 
reasserted South Vietnam’s claims.  Because of these significant gaps, 
Vietnam did not maintain effective control over the Spratly Islands, and, as 
portrayed by North Vietnam’s support of China’s claims, it would not be 
seen to have historically had the intention to act as sovereign over the 
islands.  Vietnam’s historical claims will not likely satisfy the Indonesia v. 
Malaysia standard or the Palmas Case standard for effective control. 
The Philippines’ historical claims are largely unsupported by 
international law.  The ICJ in Indonesia v. Malaysia established that 
activities by private persons cannot be seen to establish effective control if 
they are not initiated by a governmental authority or official regulation.  
Even if Cloma claims to have discovered the islands in 1947, his actions 
and claims cannot be imputed to the Philippines because he was clearly not 
acting with the Philippines’ authority.  This is evident because he claimed 
the islands for himself and established himself as the chairman of the 
Supreme Council of Kalayaan.  Furthermore, it was not until 1974, twenty-
seven years after he allegedly discovered the islands, that the Philippines 
claimed to have received ownership from him. 
Although none of the states have strong historical claims, their recent 
actions over the Spratly Islands are much more indicative of effective 
control.  However, none of these actions can be used by the states to 
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establish effective control because they take place after the date on which 
the dispute between the states crystallized.  In Indonesia v. Malaysia, the 
court found that the dispute crystallized in 1969, the year that the states 
asserted conflicting claims to the Ligitan and Sipadan islands.  With respect 
to finding the date on which the dispute over the Spratly Islands began, it 
would be much more difficult to establish a starting date because some of 
the claims the states have made are very deeply rooted in historic evidence.  
When determining the date that the dispute crystallized, the courts would 
likely look at the strong protests the states made when a competing state 
claimed sovereignty over the islands.  For example, when China strongly 
protested the French government for taking the islands in 1932 and during 
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty when the Premier of China strongly 
challenged Vietnam’s claims to the islands.  Courts would also likely look 
at the dates the states began occupying the islands.  For these reasons, a 
court would likely determine that by 1951, Vietnam and China officially 
had competing claims to the islands; by 1956, the Philippines had officially 
asserted conflicting claims to these islands; and by 1960, Brunei and 
Malaysia had announced their claims to the Spratly Islands.  Any actions 
taken after these dates, unless they were a normal continuation of previous 
acts and were not done for the purpose of improving the legal position of 
the party taking the actions, would not be used to establish effective control. 
The majority of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are 
currently occupied by a state.  China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia are all currently occupying at least a few islands.  China’s island 
construction in the South China Sea is unprecedented.  The construction of 
port facilities, military buildings, and airstrips on the islands are 
undoubtedly the acts of China as a sovereign state, and it demonstrates 
authority and control over the islands that China occupies.  The new islands 
enable China to maintain effective control not only on the islands it 
occupies, but also of the surrounding waters and sea-beds.  Furthermore, the 
military confrontations between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea 
demonstrate both the intention to act as a sovereign over the Spratly Islands 
and an actual exercise by the government to establish and maintain 
sovereign control over the islands that they claim.  However, none of this 
would be considered by a court when determining if China has 
demonstrated effective control.  This is because these actions occurred 
significantly after the four other competing states asserted their claims to 
the islands, and these actions are not a continuation of the acts of the 
Chinese fishermen and cartographers that China used as evidence to bolster 
its claims.  Furthermore, it is highly likely that a court would see China’s 
island building as an attempt to solidify its claims in the South China Sea, 
and, as stated in Indonesia v. Malaysia, acts done for the purpose of 
improving the legal position of the party taking the actions will not be used 
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to establish effective control. 
China is not the only state that would have this problem.  As of 2015, 
Vietnam has also been constructing and expanding the borders of the 
islands that it occupies.184  It was the first state to build an airstrip on one of 
the islands that it occupies.185  The Philippines has also recently engaged in 
island construction and also has an airstrip on one of the islands it occupies.  
As of 2016, there were Filipino military forces on a few of the contested 
islands.  Student protestors were also recently present on one of the islands, 
trying to bolster the Philippines claims to the Spratly Islands and condemn 
China’s continuous island building.  Malaysia also has an airstrip on one of 
the islands that it occupies. 
A court would not use any of these actions as evidence of effective 
control by any of these states because they all occurred after the states 
asserted the conflicting claims to the islands.  Furthermore, it is highly 
likely that a court would see these actions as an attempt to solidify the 
states’ claims in the South China Sea.  The Philippines specifically runs 
against an additional problem since the student protestors on the islands 
would not buttress effective control because the students are private 
individuals and their acts would not be imputed to the Filipino government. 
 
D. THE PHILIPPINES V. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
 
In 2013, the Philippines filed a complaint with the PCA to institute 
arbitral proceedings against China.186  It invoked Article 287 of UNCLOS 
and unilaterally initiated proceedings with the PCA.187  This dispute 
concerned China’s claims over the maritime jurisdiction of the Philippines 
in the South China Sea.188  Essentially, the Philippines asked the PCA to 
make three findings: 1) that the “nine-dash-line” contradicts UNCLOS and 
that UNCLOS should be the only basis for maritime jurisdiction and 
sovereignty; 2) that contested maritime formations189 are not entitled to the 
adjoining continental shelf or the 200-mile EEZ; and 3) that China’s actions 
and behaviors in the South China Sea violate its obligations under 
 
184  See Tan Qiuyi, Vietnam Defends Construction in Disputed South China Sea, CHANNEL NEWS 
ASIA (May 14, 2015, 8:32 PM). 
185  See Airpower in the South China Sea, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (July 29, 2015), 
https://amti.csis.org/airstrips-scs/. 
186  See generally Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109. 
187  See Christopher Mirasola, A Shifting Tide in the South China Sea: The Permanent Court of 
Arbitration Declares Jurisdiction, HARV. INT’L L.J. (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.harvardilj.org/2015/11/ 
a-shifting-tide-in-the-south-china-sea-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration-declares-jurisdiction/. 
188  See generally Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109. 
189  Including reefs, atolls, isles, islets, etc. 
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UNCLOS and interfere with the Philippines’ sovereignty.190  On July 12, 
2016, the PCA issued its unanimous and final Award, concluding the 
case.191 
Although the PCA did find that it had jurisdiction over the dispute as 
per the Articles of UNCLOS, China rejected, and has continued to reject, 
the authority of the Tribunal and refused to participate in the arbitration.192  
China was absent on the day of the hearing on jurisdiction, but it did 
publish a position paper outlining its legal claims to the islands and 
contesting all the claims made by the Philippines.193  Although China 
refused to participate in the proceedings, the PCA used China’s position 
paper in its decision-making and cited to the position paper in its Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility and in its final Award.194  In its position 
paper, China responded that without first determining which state has 
territorial sovereignty over the islands, the PCA cannot determine the extent 
of China’s or the Philippines’ maritime claims.195  China also correctly 
stressed that tribunals established under Article 287 and Annex VII of 
UNCLOS, like the PCA, have no jurisdiction over territorial disputes.196  
China expressed that, for the PCA to resolve the maritime dispute, it would 
have to also make territorial determinations, which would contravene the 
“general principles of international law and international jurisprudence on 
the settlement of international maritime disputes.”197  Moreover, China 
argued that through the Consultation on the South China Sea and on Other 
Areas of Cooperation, issued August 10, 1995; the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, agreed upon in 2002; and the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, all signatory states 
agreed to resolve all disputes through negotiations and therefore excluded 
any means of third-party settlement.198 
Ultimately, on October 29, 2015, the PCA unanimously decided that it 
had jurisdiction over seven of the fifteen claims initiated by the 
Philippines.199  It reserved judgment on the other eight claims,200 and, in its 
 
190  See Mirasola, supra note 187. 
191  See generally Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109. 
192  See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 18; see 
generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 16. 
193  See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 18; see 
generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 16. 
194  See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 18; see 
generally Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109. 
195  See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 18. 
196  Id. 
197  Id. 
198  See id. 
199  See generally Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109; see also Mirasola, supra note 187. 
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final Award, it unanimously decided that it had complete jurisdiction over 
all but two of the claims.201  Because neither China nor the Philippines 
opted for a specific type of dispute resolution when they ratified UNCLOS, 
the PCA found that the Philippines was justified in initiating proceedings 
with the PCA.  The PCA also found that China’s refusal to participate 
would not hinder the proceedings because “the absence of a party or failure 
of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings.”202 
Although China was not present, the PCA claimed that it implemented 
procedural safeguards to protect China’s rights.203  Normally, in 
determining whether a state abused process in initiating proceedings, the 
PCA will use the standard adopted in Article 294 at a defending state’s 
request.  This is the “blatant cases of abuse or harassment” standard.  
However, the PCA adopted a weaker standard when it determined whether 
the Philippines abused process in initiating these proceedings instead of the 
more rigorous standard established in Article 294 because China did not 
request it.204  The PCA also found that the bilateral and multilateral treaties 
and decisions entered into by China and the Philippines did not bar the 
PCA’s jurisdiction because these documents did not represent a settlement 
between the parties,205 did not exclude other dispute resolution 
mechanisms,206 and do not require that the parties indefinitely pursue 
unsuccessful negotiations.207 
In its final Award, the PCA was cautious to explicitly delimit the scope 
of its decision.  The Tribunal recognized and honored China’s 2006 
declaration to UNCLOS that excluded maritime boundary delimitations 
from China’s acceptance of compulsory dispute settlement.208  Because of 
this, the Tribunal stated that it would not make any rulings as to maritime 
delimitations.209  Furthermore, at the very beginning of the Award, the 
Tribunal also stated that it did not purport to make any rulings as to which 
state enjoys sovereignty over any land territory.210  It emphasized that none 
of the decisions were dependent on findings of sovereignty.211 
 
200  Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109, at ¶ 34. 
201  The PCA found that it had jurisdiction over submissions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13, and 14d but not 14a, 14b, 14c, or 15. Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109, at ¶ 1203(A)(8). 
202  Mirasola, supra note 187. 
203  See Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109, at ¶ 117. 
204  See id. at ¶ 128. 
205  Id. 
206  Id. at ¶ 134. 
207  Id. at ¶ 141. 
208  Id. at ¶ 6. 
209  Id. 
210  Id. at ¶ 5. 
211  Id. 
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With respect to the Philippines’ first claim—that the “nine-dash-line” 
contradicts UNCLOS and that UNCLOS should be the only basis for 
maritime jurisdiction and sovereignty—the Tribunal found in favor of the 
Philippines.  The Award concluded that China’s historic claims to the South 
China Seas could not survive to the extent that they contradicted the rights 
and obligations provided for in UNCLOS.212  The Award continued by 
explaining that although China made claims that there were navigators and 
fishermen on the islands, there was no evidence of control over the waters 
or resources.213  The PCA found no legal basis for China’s historic claims to 
the seas within the “nine-dash-line” that would supersede UNCLOS.214 
With respect to the Philippines’ second claim—that contested 
maritime formations, including reefs, are not entitled to the adjoining 
continental shelf or the 200-mile EEZ—the PCA also found in favor of the 
Philippines.  The PCA scrutinized the language of Article 121 of UNCLOS 
when reaching its decision, which states that 
1) An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded 
by water, which is above water at high tide; 2) Except as 
provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the 
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance 
with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other 
land territory; and 3) Rocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.215 
The PCA explained that in order to determine compliance with Article 
121, the Tribunal must examine the objective capacity of a feature in its 
natural condition.216  Furthermore, whether a disputed feature is capable of 
sustaining human or economic life is decide on a case-by-case basis.217  
However, the PCA decided that the presence of people dependent on 
outside support, and not reflective of the capacity of the features, would not 
be sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the rocks sustain human 
habitation or economic life.218  The Tribunal looked to China’s historic 
claims and found that the alleged presence of fishermen and navigators on 
some of the islands was only transient, and therefore insufficient to 
 
212  Id. at ¶ 277, 278. 
213  Id. 
214  Id. 
215  Id. at ¶ 386. 
216  Id. at ¶ 305. 
217  Id. at ¶ 546. 
218  Id. at ¶ 547. 
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establish inhabitation.219  Overall, the Tribunal held that none of the 
contested features claimed by China were capable of generating an EEZ and 
that some of these features were within the Philippines’ EEZ.220 
As to the Philippines’ last claim—that China’s actions and behaviors 
in the South China Sea violate its obligations under UNCLOS and interfere 
with the Philippines’ sovereignty—the PCA also found in favor of the 
Philippines.  Overall, the Tribunal found that China violated the 
Philippines’ sovereignty in three ways.221  First, the Tribunal found China 
was interfering with the Philippines’ fishing and petroleum exploration in 
the Philippines’ EEZ.222  Second, China violated the Philippines’ 
sovereignty by constructing artificial islands in the Philippines’ EEZ.223  
Last, the Tribunal believed that China violated the Philippines’ sovereignty 
by failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the Philippines’ 
EEZ.224 
At a time when the majority of the world’s super-powers are cynical 
about the enforcement power of international courts and tribunals, the PCA 
acted wisely in issuing a very cautious and limited decision when it granted 
its Award.  From the very beginning, it expressly stated that it was not 
making any decisions as to territorial sovereignty or maritime delimitations.  
Furthermore, its decision concerning the “nine-dash-line” only reinforced 
the internationally recognized standard that treaty law prevails over all other 
claims.  Also, the Tribunal’s decision that the contested features could not 
generate an EEZ, was narrow in that it did not preclude any state from 
claiming sovereignty over the features, only from claiming the extended 
twelve-mile EEZ.  Even its decision about China’s aggressive island 
building in the South China Sea was limited to their island building within 
the Philippines’ EEZ.  Despite this narrow ruling, China has already stated 
that it would not abide by the decision issued by the Tribunal.225  Tensions 
have already escalated as, in August 2016, the Chinese Defense Minister 
called for preparations for a “people’s war at sea.”226 
China saw the Philippines submitting this dispute to the PCA as 
aggressive.227  China believed it was a decision that was tactically unwise 
and made in bad faith.  The Philippines and China both previously agreed to 
 
219  Id. at ¶ 618. 
220  Id. at ¶ 647. 
221  Id. at ¶ 1203(B)(10)–(14). 
222  Id. at ¶ 1203 (B)(11). 
223  Id. at ¶ 1203 (B)(14). 
224  Id. at ¶ 1203 (B)(10). 
225  Olson, supra note 116. 
226  Id. 
227  See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 18. 
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the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which 
stated that all parties involved in the dispute over the Spratly Islands would 
engage in peaceful negotiations amongst themselves and not refer the 
matter to a third party for dispute resolution.228  Since the Philippines 
violated the terms of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea by referring the case to the PCA, China has increased and 
strengthened its military presence in the disputed area.229  Also, current 
reports show that China has become increasingly aggressive in recent 
months in asserting its claim to the Spratly Islands.230  This is evidenced by 
their construction of new islands in the South China Sea, which contain 
“port facilities, military buildings and an airstrip . . . with recent imagery 
showing evidence of two more airstrips under construction.”231  China did 
not begin its massive dredging project on the reefs until late 2013, the same 
year the Philippines decided to submit its case for arbitration to the PCA.232  
These newly built islands are an attempt to solidify its claims to the islands 
in the area and will enable the Chinese to continuously patrol the area by 
sea and air.233 
The decision made by the PCA did not resolve the continuing dispute 
over the Spratly Islands.  Most importantly, the Philippines and China were 
the only two parties to the case at the PCA.  The decision not only left the 
territorial dispute unresolved as to those two parties, but it ignored the 
claims and problems that the other three states have been asserting.  The 
Spratly Islands dispute is not a dispute that can be resolved by arbitration 
between only two of the five parties.  Because of the multilateral nature of 
this dispute, a bilateral decision by a third party ignores the complexity of 
the ongoing situation and leaves the dispute largely unresolved.  While 
bilateral agreements between states could work to help alleviate the tensions 
between China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, one 
bilateral agreement will not resolve the problems that have arisen in the 
South China Sea.  Although the PCA did not make determinations about 
which state has territorial rights to which islands, its decision undoubtedly 
affected the ever-evolving relationships between China, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia. 
 
 
228  See Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, supra note 31, at section 4. 
229  See Goldenziel, supra note 8. 
230  See Shankar, supra note 95; Vishakha Sonawane, South China Sea Controversy: Chinese 
Military Aircraft Likely to Take Off From Spratly Islands in First Half of 2016, Ex-Army Official Says, 
INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016, 4:59 AM). 
231  Watkins, supra note 15. 
232  See China Says U.S. Warship’s Spratly Islands Passage ‘Illegal,’ BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34647651. 
233  See Watkins, supra note 15. 
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E. UNITED STATES’ INVOLVEMENT 
 
Recently, the United Sates has decided that its presence in the South 
China Sea is necessary to combat China’s aggressive actions in the Spratly 
Islands.  In 2013 and 2014, the United States conducted its Freedom of 
Navigation Program exercise against China in the South China Sea.234  The 
United States’ Freedom of Navigation Program challenges what the United 
States considers to be “excessive claims” to the world’s oceans and 
airspace.235  The program was created to promote international compliance 
with UNCLOS, even though the United States never ratified the treaty.236 
The United States has confirmed that the USS Lassen, a guided-missile 
destroyer, has recently breached the twelve-nautical mile zone that China 
claims around two of the artificial islands that China occupies.237  However, 
the United States contends, “international maritime law allows countries to 
claim ownership of the twelve-nautical mile area surrounding natural 
islands, but does not allow nations to claim ownership of submerged 
features that have been raised by human intervention.”238  So, China would 
not be able to assert the twelve-nautical mile area over islands that have 
been artificially built by man.  While the United States has not officially 
endorsed the position of any of the states competing for sovereignty over 
the Spratly Islands, it has been very vocal in condemning China for its 
recent actions in the South China Sea.  Even though all five states have 
engaged in islands building, the United States has isolated the Chinese 
artificial islands in performing the Freedom of Navigation Program 
operation. 
The United States claims that its Freedom of Navigation Program was 
meant to challenge China’s claims over the islands.239  Lu Kang, a 
spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry, responded by stating that China 
would 
resolutely respond to any country’s deliberately 
provocative actions.  He added that the ship had been 
“tracked” and “warned” while on the mission to 
deliberately enter the disputed waters. [The United States] 
Defense Department spokesman . . . Bill Urban had earlier 
said that “the United States is conducting routine operations 
in the South China Sea in accordance with international 
 
234  See China Says U.S. Warship’s Spratly Islands Passage ‘Illegal,’ supra note 232. 
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236  Id. 
237  Id. 
238  Id. 
239  Id. 
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law.”240 
The operation was well received by several Asian countries, including 
the Philippines. 
The United States involvement in the South China Sea will not help 
alleviate tensions between the competing states.  Instead, the United States’ 
provocative actions are increasing tensions in the area and aggravating an 
already sensitive situation.  From the statements made by Lu Kang, it is 
likely that China would respond by matching the United States’ air and 
naval procedures and challenging the United States’ actions in the South 
China Sea.  Also, rather than taunting China, the United States should 
withdraw from the ongoing territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands.  
First, the United States should not be taking sides in the territorial dispute.  
It can continue to express its beliefs on freedom of navigation through the 
territorial waters in the South China Sea without specifically condemning 
one state’s actions.  Second, it is not justified in sending warships and 
planes over the South China Sea to strong-arm states into complying with 
international laws when the United States itself has not ratified many of the 
treaties it is trying to enforce through intimidation.  Third, the United States 
would be more effective in encouraging the competing states to work 
through negotiations and establish creative solutions to the ongoing dispute.  
The United States can accent the advantages of treaties, negotiations, and 
ongoing peace for all states concerned.  This would be much more effective 
because aggressive acts by the United States will only encourage aggressive 
acts by China.  The other four Asian states are more than capable of holding 
their own weight against China and resolving this dispute peacefully.  The 
military and aggressive actions of the United States will only cause more 
tension in an already tense area. 
 
F. JOINT DEVELOPMENT ZONE AGREEMENT 
 
Joint Development Zones are governed by UNCLOS Articles 74(3) 
and 83(3).241  These provisions allow states to 
contemplate provisional arrangements of a particular nature 
when they face deadlocks in negotiations over maritime 
delimitations. . . .  If states cannot agree on their maritime 
boundaries, they can or should instead consider cooperation 
on the disputed maritime areas, for a transitional period, 
 
240  Id. 
241  See TANGA BIANG J., THE JOINT DEVELOPMENT ZONE BETWEEN NIGERIA AND SAO TOME 
AND PRINCIPE: A CASE OF PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENT IN THE GULF OF GUINEA at viii (2010), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/tanga_0910
_cameroon.pdf. 
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while remaining under the duty of carrying negotiations 
on.242 
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe were previously disputing 
territorial and maritime sovereignty over a group of islands off of the coast 
of Nigeria.243  Both states claimed to have overlapping claims to the 
islands.244  Rather than arbitrating the dispute through an international court 
or an international tribunal, the states resolved their dispute by creating a 
Joint Development Zone Agreement, which is regulated by a Joint 
Development Authority.245 
Article 3(1) of that Joint Development Zone Agreement established 
three principles of joint development.246  The first principle is joint control 
of both parties over the exploration and exploitation of the resources in the 
joint development zone (“JDZ”).247  The second principle is optimum 
commercial utilization of the resources gathered in the JDZ.248  In the 
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development Agreement, the 
third principle established a sixty-forty percent split of benefits and 
obligations in favor of Nigeria.249 
Article 3(2) and 3(3) of the Joint Development Zone Agreement also 
established three principles that bound Nigeria and Sao Tome and 
Principe.250  The first is the due respect to the treaty.251  This principle 
established that both parties must abide by the terms of the agreement and 
respect the decisions Joint Development Authority with respect to the treaty 
and treaty interpretation.  The second principle is efficient exploitation of 
resources.252  The parties agreed to collectively explore and exploit the 
resources from the islands and the surrounding seabed in a way that was 
time and cost effective.  The third principle is diligent implementation of 
the treaty.253  Through this principle, the parties agreed to execute and abide 
by the terms established in the treaty. 
 
242  Id. 
243  See Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao 
Tome and Principe on the Joint Development of Petroleum and Other Resources, in Respect of Areas of 
the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Two States, Feb. 21, 2001, (DOALOS), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/legislationandtreaties/pdffiles/treaties/stp-nga2001.pdf. 
244  Id. 
245  Id. 
246  Id. 
247  Id. 
248  Id. 
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The Joint Development Zone Agreement also includes a no prejudice 
clause in Article 4.254  Article 4 states that 
nothing contained in this Treaty shall be interpreted as a 
renunciation of any right or claim relating to the whole or 
any part of the Zone by either State Party or as recognition 
of the other State Party’s position with regard to any right 
or claim to the Zone or any part thereof.255 
Also, Article 4.2 states that 
no act or activities taking place as a consequence of this 
Treaty or its operation, and no law operating in the Zone by 
virtue of this treaty, may be relied on as a basis for 
asserting, supporting or denying the position of either State 
Party with regard to rights or claims over the zone or any 
part thereof.256 
Through these two articles, both Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe 
agree that, by participating in this Joint Development Zone Agreement, they 
are not relinquishing or solidifying any claims that they could possibly have 
to islands. 
The ideal solution for all states involved in the Spratly Islands dispute 
would be to set up a Joint Development Zone Agreement much like the one 
created by Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe.  This would be the best plan 
considering that none of the states have very strong claims to the islands 
that they are contesting.  This would prove to be especially lucrative for 
China, which has proved to be unwilling to work through international 
courts, as is evident from the facts that it is not a signatory to the ICJ and 
has already rejected the authority of the PCA.257 
Although China has rejected the involvement of third parties in the 
case, China will likely be willing to work directly with the other states 
involved in the dispute in the South China Sea.  This is evident from its 
signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.  
It would also be in the best interest of all parties involved to work through a 
joint development zone agreement because of the weakness of their own 
claims and China’s historic refusal to settle situations through the 
international courts.  They would also likely be willing to work directly 
with China and the other states involved as is evident from their signing of 
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.  
Furthermore, China has articulated through its position paper that it “firmly 
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257  See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 18. 
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believes that the most effective means for settlement of maritime disputes 
between China and its neighboring States is that of friendly consultations 
and negotiations between the sovereign States directly concerned.”258 
The ideal joint development zone agreement between China, Vietnam, 
the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei would share many of the same 
principles as the agreement between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe.  
In the agreement between the Asian states, there should be joint control 
over the exploration and exploitation of the islands and the surrounding 
seabed.  All states involved would take part in using the waters for fishing 
and excavating the hydrocarbons from the seabed.  Moreover, all states 
would agree to the optimum commercial utilization of the resources 
gathered in the JDZ.  Although the Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe 
Joint Development Zone Agreement separates the benefits and 
responsibilities respectively into sixty and forty per cent shares, this 
solution would not be acceptable to the Asian states.  This would not work 
for the Asian states because a sixty—forty split is not functional between 
five states. 
The states would also be responsible for establishing a Joint 
Development Authority to arbitrate between the states anytime an issue 
arises under the agreement that could not be resolved through negotiations.  
The Joint Development Authority would be made up of representatives 
from each state, and the states would agree to abide by the decisions made 
by the authority on matters pertaining to treaty interpretation and 
enforcement.  While the decisions by the Joint Development Authority 
would be no more binding than a decision by the ICJ or the PCA, the states, 
particularly China, would likely be more open to abide by its decisions 
because the authority would be enforcing a document and agreement that 
each state actively participated in making.  Moreover, the Joint 
Development Authority would only arbitrate on problems that could not be 
resolved through negotiations, and China has been open to negotiations and 
consultations with the other state parties involved in the Spratly Island 
dispute. 
In the case of China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, 
the best solution would be to divide the benefits and responsibilities 
according to present effective control.  Although an international court 
would not look to actions that arose after the competing state asserted its 
claims, this does not prevent multiple states from doing differently in their 
treaties and agreements.  For this type of agreement, each state would have 
to prove that it did have effective control over the island in question.  It 
would have to establish this to the approval of the Joint Development Zone 
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Authority and meet the standard established in Indonesia v. Malaysia and 
the Palmas Case.  This should not be a difficult standard for any of the 
states because the majority of the islands are occupied and, in recent years, 
states have been working to solidify their legal claims in the South China 
Sea through island building and militarization.  However, it would be 
crucial to establish that, similar to the object and purpose of Article 4 and 
4.2 of the Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development 
Agreement, any decision as to effective control made by the Joint 
Development Agreement would not establish effective control for other 
purposes and would not be used to bolster any states claim in a matter 
outside of the Joint Development Agreement. 
Each state would be responsible for excavation of the resources of the 
islands over which they currently have effective control.  They would 
individually benefit from whatever they could collect from these islands 
and the surrounding seabed.  With respect to the islands that no state has 
effective control over, the competing states would enter into bilateral or 
multilateral agreements with the states that lay claims to the islands, to 
resolve, between the competing states, how to divide the work and profits.  
These bilateral and multilateral agreements would be overseen by the Joint 
Development Authority and arbitrated by it should negotiations not resolve 
the problem. 
The states that occupy islands would also have the right to the twelve-
nautical mile zone from the occupied island, but would have to agree to 
leave the southern portion of the South China Sea open for all states to 
freely navigate.  This is crucial to help prevent third party states, like the 
United States, from becoming involved in the Spratly Island dispute.  The 
United States has been vocal through the press and its Freedom of 
Navigation Exercises that its presence throughout the Spratly Islands is to 
ensure that China does not prevent states from navigating through these 
waters.  This sea is of particular importance to third party states because it 
is rich in fishing lanes and necessary for trade with many East Asian states.  
If any state were to close off this area from the presence of foreign ships, 
these foreign ships and their respective states and businesses, would not 
have an outlet or means of reaching many of the East Asian ports for trade.  
Because of the high value of trade, and the desire to keep third parties 
uninvolved in this dispute, it is necessary for the five competing states to 
leave this area open to foreign ships and stress their commitment to 
freedom of navigation throughout the Spratly Islands.  For this to work, the 
states would also have to demilitarize whatever islands they are occupying.  
Having the islands militarized only serves to escalate tensions between the 
competing states and third party states, and would cause unnecessary stress 
to whatever peaceful negotiations and plans the states would have. 
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The Asian states would likely be open to this type of agreement, as is 
evident from their past attempts to work through bilateral and multilateral 
agreements.  In the past, China has entered into numerous bilateral treaties 
with the states involved in the dispute.  It has also entered into multilateral 
conventions with other Asian states.  Also, the states have previously 
expressed their desires to work with each other and go through third parties 
to resolve the ongoing dispute in the Spratly Islands.  Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei will likely also be open to working 
through bilateral treaties because they will be able to negotiate agreements 





While the Spratly Islands are generally too small and arid to support 
permanent settlements, have limited fresh water sources, and few 
significant mainland resources, their value to China, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei lies in their strategic, political, and 
economic worth.  Throughout history these five states have been laying 
claims to this group of islands with varying levels of success.  The claims 
range from discovery, occupation, and uti possidetis, to claims based on 
proximity and UNCLOS. 
Although the claims made by the states are many, their legal 
justifications are few.  In light of the decision of the ICJ in Indonesia v. 
Malaysia, and of the decision by the PCA in the Palmas Case, none of the 
states have taken the requisite actions necessary to establish sovereignty 
over the Spratly Islands.  The actions of the states do not evince the 
necessary intention to act as sovereign; display and exercise of authority 
over the disputed area; or maintained control, which is needed to prove 
effective control.  Moreover, the claims that arise from UNCLOS stem from 
a misreading of the convention and are therefore insufficient to establish 
sovereignty. 
In recent years, tensions in the South China Sea have escalated 
drastically.  China’s unprecedented island building has been a cause for 
concern for the competing states, and the United States’ Freedom of 
Navigation exercises have been a cause of concern for the Chinese 
government.  Also, the increased militarization of the area by the states 
involved in the dispute is a major concern.  Because of the escalating 
tensions, it is of the utmost importance that the Spratly Islands dispute be 
resolved as quickly as possible. 
Because of the flawed claims by the states, and China’s historic refusal 
to work through international courts, the best and quickest resolution would 
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be to establish a Joint Development Zone Agreement between the five 
competing states.  This would work to help ease the tensions between 
China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei because it would 
encourage peaceful negotiations and shared responsibilities to explore and 
exploit the resources in the South China Sea. 
The ongoing territorial and maritime dispute over the Spratly Islands is 
an example of the shortcomings of the international court system.  Even 
though all these states have competing claims to the islands, under the 
existing law, none of their claims would be sufficient to establish 
sovereignty.  This has led to the militarization of the area and rising 
tensions that the courts are currently incapable of solving.  Even though the 
courts will not resolve this dispute, the Joint Development Zone Agreement 
between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe exemplifies the power of 
peaceful negotiations.  In that case, the answer to the problems that arose 
from overlapping claims came from bilateral, peaceful negotiations and the 
direct involvement of the competing parties without the intervention of 
third party states or organizations.  Similarly, the answer to the problem in 
the Spratly Islands will only arise from the five competing states working 
together without third party intervention.  China, a global economic and 
military force, has seen the benefits of these types of negotiations.  It has 
encouraged peaceful discussions and condemned third party involvement in 
an effort to resolve the historical dispute; an approach that would be 
beneficial for any states currently involved in maritime or territorial 
disputes.  Although China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei 
have been unable to resolve the on-going problems in the South China Sea, 
peaceful and continuous negotiations would be the ideal solution to cut the 
Gordian knot that has arisen over the Spratly Islands. 
 
